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I. INTRODUCTION
Hope v. Perales1 is one of the latest abortion decisions in a line of
cases in which state courts have expansively interpreted their state
constitutions to broaden their citizens' right of privacy beyond what is
Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
1. 571 N.Y.S.2d 972 (Sup. Ct. 1991), aff'd, 595 N.Y.S.2d 948 (App. Div. 1993)(per
curiam).
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federally mandated. The Supreme Court of New York County de-
clared invalid the Prenatal Care Assistance Program (PCAP) which
provided prenatal medical assistance but did not fund abortions, medi-
cally necessary or otherwise, to pregnant women who had incomes be-
low 185 percent of the federal poverty line. The court decided that the
program discriminated against the fundamental right of those women
who needed an abortion but could not obtain one, and thus, violated
due process and was unconstitutional.
This Note analyzes the significance of the Hope court's holding and
the possible value of its reasoning if applied in a Nebraska court faced
with the question of the constitutionality of the current Medicaid pro-
gram that only funds abortions when the life of the mother is endan-
gered. First, the Hope decision will be outlined. Second, the federal
law in this area and its impact on the states will be discussed. Next,
the Hope decision will be compared with the analysis in previous cases
construing the due process clause of the New York Constitution. The
New York and Nebraska histories in construing their state constitu-
tions will also be examined. Finally, the Hope analysis will be applied
to the Nebraska due process clause. This Note then concludes that the
Hope reasoning and analysis provide Nebraska courts a prime oppor-
tunity to enlarge Nebraska citizens' privacy rights, especially those of
indigent pregnant women.
II. HOPE v. PERALES
A. Facts and Issues
The Prenatal Care Assistance Program (PCAP) is a medical assist-
ance program in New York that offers services to pregnant women
with incomes between 100 percent and 185 percent of the federal pov-
erty line to assure them a healthy pregnancy, delivery, and recovery.
Initially a federal program, PCAP presently only provides reimburse-
ment for procedures authorized by statute.2 Chapter 584 of the Laws
of New York was adopted to enumerate the guidelines for New York's
program and allows funding to the extent of federal reimbursement.
Excluded are funds for medically necessary abortions performed by
health care providers.3 However, PCAP cannot refuse other services
available through the program to women who have had an abortion,
such as transportation to covered services or medical services follow-
ing an abortion to ensure a healthy recovery.4
Jane Hope and Jane Moe, two pregnant women with incomes be-
tween 100 percent and 185 percent of the federal poverty line, were
denied medically necessary abortions under this statute. These two
2. Id1 at 975.
3. I& at 976 (interpreting N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2522 (McKinney Supp. 1993)).'
4. I& at 974 (interpreting N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2522 (McKinney Supp. 1993)).
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women, along with four physicians, one nurse-midwife, seven health
care clinics providing services for women in the PCAP income
bracket, four advocacy organizations, and two members of the clergy
sought injunctive relief from Chapter 584 and a declaration that the
plaintiffs and women of their class were entitled to have PCAP-
funded medically necessary abortions. Plaintiffs were denied a tempo-
rary restraining order enjoining enforcement of Chapter 584.5
Plaintiffs challenged Chapter 584 on the theory that the statute
violated the New York State Constitution's due process clause6 by not
reimbursing health care providers who performed medically neces-
sary abortions to women in the PCAP income bracket. Plaintiffs ar-
gued that the funding system frustrated the reproductive choices of
these women and that the system pressured women toward one of two
choices, childbirth.
Plaintiffs made it very clear that they did not wish to stop the serv-
ices provided but only that they wished to broaden the scope of
services funded by PCAP.7 The court focused on the issue of whether
the PCAP funding system prevents an eligible woman from exercising
her constitutional right to an abortion without governmental
interference.8
B. Opinion
The court held that PCAP violated the due process rights of pro-
gram eligible pregnant women in need of a medically necessary abor-
tion by leaving no real choice in whether to abort a pregnancy or to
give birth to a child.9 In reaching its decision, the court emphasized
New York's long and liberal history in construing its state
constitution.
First, the court argued that New York recognized a woman's right
to an abortion three years before the United States Supreme Court's
similar decision in Roe v. Wade.1O The court emphasized that even
though the Supreme Court held that the federal constitution does not
require states to pay an indigent woman's pregnancy related expenses,
it has decided that when such an obligation to provide medical care to
5. Id
6. Plaintiffs also challenged the validity of Chapter 584 on the basis that it violated
other provisions of the New York State Constitution. Specifically, they alleged
violations of the State Constitution's free exercise of religion clause, the equal
protection clause, the clause pledging aid, care and support of the needy, and the
clause pledging protection and promotion of the health of the inhabitants of the
State. Id. Two of these causes of action were withdrawn. Id- at 975. This note
will not discuss the court's decision concerning these clauses.
7. IM at 975.
8. Id. at 976.
9. Id at 980.
10. Id at 976.
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indigents has been assumed by a state, the state cannot avoid constitu-
tional limitations on the way in which it dispenses benefits."1 The
court concluded that since PCAP's funding scheme provided funding
for childbirth, only one of two possible alternatives, the scheme vio-
lated the constitutional right to privacy derived from the due process
clause of the New York Constitution.12
The court relied on the fact that the state constitution's due pro-
cess clause had been construed to give greater rights than the due pro-
cess clause of the federal constitution to those it was meant to
protect.13 In addition, New York decided to fund" abortions in the
Medicaid program even though the United States Supreme Court held
that such funding was not mandated by the federal constitution and
was not reimbursed by the federal government.14 The court also rec-
ognized that New York City had authorized the New York City
Health and Hospitals Corporation to provide medically necessary
abortions, at the city's expense, to those women eligible for PCAP.15
The court then supported its assertion that the right to privacy in-
cludes the right of an individual to make decisions according to one's
own conscience, free from governmental interference.16 In support of
its decision, the court cited numerous decisions of the United States
Supreme Court that gave citizens the right to decide issues such as
procreation, contraception, and abortion free from governmental re-
straint in the name of privacy.' 7
The New York court made it clear that there are many New York
cases construing the state constitution as expanding the rights of its
citizens beyond that conferred by the federal constitution.' 8 Even
though the language of the New York and federal due process clauses
are identical, the court claimed that the state clause grants more
rights to its citizens than the federal clause.19
The court next reasoned that the proper question when a statute is
challenged on non-procedural due process grounds is "whether there
is some 'fair, just and reasonable connection' between it [the chal-
lenged statute] and the promotion of the health, comfort, safety and
11. Id. (citing Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469-70 (1977)).
12. Hope v. Perales, 571 N.Y.S.2d 972, 976-77 (Sup. Ct. 1991), aff'd, 595 N.Y.S.2d 948
(App. Div. 1993).
13. I at 977.
14. I
15. Id
16. Id.
17. Id. (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstedt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)).
18. Id. at 978. These cases will be explored in the analysis of this Note. See infra text
accompanying notes 53-80.
19. Hope v. Perales, 511 N.Y.S.2d 972, 978 (Sup. Ct. 1991), aff'd, 595 N.Y.S.2d 948
(App. Div. 1993).
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welfare of society."20 The court restated that a previous case had held
that a pregnant woman has a right to choose an abortion when medi-
cally indicated.21 Because the purpose of PCAP is to decrease infant
mortality and to increase the likelihood of healthy babies, the court
decided that there was no way to reach these objectives by excluding
funds for abortions.22 For example, Hope, a carrier of sickle cell ane-
mia, was denied an abortion. She had no way to obtain an abortion
even though her income was above the poverty line because she could
not afford insurance coverage. Since the abortion could not be funded,
Hope was required to carry the child even though doing so endangered
her health and she was likely to give birth to a sick child. The court
concluded that this type of result was "not 'fairly,' 'justly,' 'rationally'
or 'reasonably' related" to the state's objectives of decreasing infant
mortality and low birth weight.23
According to the court, the legislature is allowed to prefer carrying
a child to term over abortion, but the legislature is not allowed to
trample constitutional rights in order to obtain the result.24 PCAP
pressured indigent women into the state's chosen result and prevented
them from exercising their constitutional rights.25 The court refused
to allow the legislature to deny a woman a real decision in whether to
give birth.26 The court held that an assistance program that condi-
tions funding on the choice of the state's preferred result, as in this
case, is basing its qualifications on conduct and not need, therefore co-
ercing the loss of a constitutional right that could harm the woman.27
Even though the court recognized that a state has no obligation to
treat childbirth and abortion the same, the court found it inconsistent
to assert that a program providing prenatal services furthers even an
important, let alone compelling, state interest when eligible women
are denied assistance despite their medical need.28 The court held
that "[a]s PCAP presently stands it violates the due process rights of a
pregnant eligible woman for whom an abortion is medically necessary
by leaving her with no real choice in the decision of whether to 'bear
or beget a child.' "29
20. Id- (quoting Montgomery v. Daniels, 340 N.E.2d 444 (N.Y. 1975).
21. Id
22. Id-
23. I& at 979.
24. Id-
25. Id-
26. I&
27. I& at 979-80.
28. Id at 980.
29. Id.
[Vol. 72:586
ABORTION RIGHTS
III. ANALYSIS
The New York court's reasoning is convincing because it properly
applied the required strict scrutiny due process analysis to protect the
fundamental rights-a woman's right to have an abortion and to make
choices concerning her health-at stake. This decision furthers a tra-
dition of protecting New York citizens' constitutional rights whenever
a New York court deems the United States Supreme Court will not or
has not read the U.S. Constitution as broadly as it should. It can be
argued that the Hope reasoning can be applied to the Nebraska State
Constitution due process clause and offers the Nebraska courts a way
to ensure the rights, health, and safety of their pregnant citizens.
Although the two states' respective histories in construing their state
constitutions and due process clauses have heretofore been dissimilar,
there is no reason that Nebraska courts could not conclude that medi-
cally necessary abortions must be funded (at state expense) for wo-
men who otherwise would be eligible to obtain prenatal care under
Medicaid, using the reasoning in Hope.
A. Federal Law and its Impact on Funding Medically Necessary
Abortions in the States
It is first necessary to understand that no federal funding can be
used for abortions unless the "continuation of the pregnancy would
endanger the mother's life."30 Federal financial participation (FFP)
will only be given when a physician has found, and certified in writing,
that the above condition is met.31 No FFP is available if the Medicaid
agency has paid prior to receiving the certification of the physician.3 2
The primary difference between the PCAP funding in Hope and Medi-
caid funding in Nebraska is that federal funding under PCAP is ex-
plicitly delineated in statutes while Medicaid funding generally
reimburses for "all medically necessary care rendered to qualified in-
dividuals,"33 with an exception for abortions when the life of the
mother is endangered.34 Despite this difference, however, the pro-
grams are similar in two ways. First, both programs fund pregnancy-
related expenses but do not fund medically necessary abortions. Sec-
30. 42 C.F.R. § 441.200 (1992).
31. 42 C.F.R. § 441.203 (1992).
32. 42 C.F.P. § 441.206 (1992).
33. Hope v. Perales, 571 N.Y.S.2d 972, 975 (Sup. Ct. 1991), aff'd, 595 N.Y.S.2d 948
(App. Div. 1993).
34. It is necessary to note that "medically necessary" procedures do not include only
those procedures necessary to save the mother's life although a procedure to save
life is included within this category. "Medically necessary" procedures usually
include those necessary to prevent, diagnose, or prevent the worsening of a condi-
tion that causes pain, deformity, or illness and no other effective course of treat-
ment is available for the patient that is more conservative or less expensive. See,
eg., Moe v. Secretary of Admin. and Fin., 417 N.E.2d 387, 391 (Mass. 1981).
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ond, both programs, if found to violate their respective state due pro-
cess clauses, must be funded by the states themselves and not federal
funds.
The Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of a partici-
pating Medicaid state's decision to refuse to pay for abortions even
though it provides funding for childbirth expenses under the federal
constitution. In Maher v. Roe,35 the United States Supreme Court de-
cided that the U.S. Constitution does not require a state participating
in the Medicaid program to pay for non-therapeutic abortions when
the state also pays for childbirth. At issue in the case were the Con-
necticut Welfare Department's limits on Medicaid funding. In Con-
necticut funding could only be used for "medically necessary"
abortions.36 The Court's reasoning, however, was arguably based only
on the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and not
the due process clause.S7 The Court decided that indigent women are
not considered a suspect class for equal protection purposes 38 and eas-
ily found that the state's regulation was rationally related to its pur-
pose because subsidizing the costs of pregnancy are rationally related
to encouraging childbirth.39 Dissenting in Maher, Justice Brennan
recognized that the regulations interfered with the enjoyment of fun-
damental rights. Therefore, he criticized the majority for not recog-
nizing these fundamental rights were present and a meritorious due
process claim was presented by the case.40 Brennan proclaimed that
withholding benefits in a manner that discourages the exercise of fun-
damental rights4l violated the due process clause.42
As can be seen, the Hope court used the same reasoning as Justice
Brennan and relies on Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in its deci-
sion. Brennan's reasoning is particularly applicable to this Note be-
cause his due process argument would be essentially the same
argument a lawyer in Nebraska would use under the state constitu-
tion's due process clause. The one crucial difference is that the statute
in Maher concerned non-therapeutic, or elective, abortions, while Ne-
braska will not even fund those abortions necessary for the health of
the mother. Therefore, the argument should be even more persuasive.
35. 432 U.S. 464, 470 (1977).
36. IH at 466.
37. I- at 470.
38. Id Because of this determination, the state needed not find a compelling state
interest to justify its regulation. The court also noted that since the regulation
did not prevent the woman from getting an abortion, it did not impinge on a wo-
man's right to an abortion. Id. at 474.
39. Id at 478-79. A similar conclusion was reached in Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
40. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 484 (1977)(Brennan, J., dissenting).
41. Brennan argued that the Court had decided that the right to privacy was funda-
mental. Id at 486 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
42. Id- at 489 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 72:586
ABORTION RIGHTS
The Supreme Court later struck another blow against pregnant
women requiring medically necessary abortions. The Court held in
Harris v. McRae43 that a state participating in the Medicaid program
was not required to fund medically necessary abortions when no fed-
eral reimbursement was allowed.44 Relying on its decision in Maher,
the Court argued that the lack of federal funding placed no burden on
a woman's right to have an abortion and reasoned that merely because
a woman has a right does not give her an entitlement to have that
right reimbursed at state expense.45 Again, Brennan strongly dis-
sented, arguing that the state has no right to use its power to burden a
woman's fundamental right to choose an abortion.4 6
These cases obviously show the Supreme Court's reluctance to
fund abortions, even when the mother's life could be adversely ef-
fected. These decisions have a great impact on people's lives and
health and may lead to feelings of helplessness and hopelessness.
However, a solution has been found. The federal constitutional rights
construed by the Supreme Court represent the minimum guaranteed
rights of a United States citizen. The fifty states are independent sov-
ereigns that can grant more, but not less, rights under their state con-
stitutions than the minimum mandated by the United States
Constitution. Therefore, a few state courts have been encouraged by
their citizens to interpret their state constitutional due process clauses
more broadly than the federal due process clause to assure that medi-
cally necessary abortions for indigent women are funded.47 Addition-
ally, commentators have encouraged more states to take advantage of
the "richness state constitutions afford litigators seeking to lessen the
impact of federal decisions narrowly interpreting Constitutional
rights."48 Since each of the fifty states have their own constitution
which can be interpreted independently from the United States Con-
43. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
44. Id. at 326. The "Hyde Amendment," which was in dispute in this case and cur-
rently in effect, is a restriction enacted by Congress prohibiting the use of federal
funds to reimburse any abortions unless carrying the fetus to term would endan-
ger the mother's life or in cases when the mother had been a victim of rape or
incest, if the crime had been reported promptly. Id. at 302.
45. Id. at 316. The Court also decided that the Hyde Amendment did not violate the
establishment clause, id. at 319-20, or the equal protection clause, id. at 326.
46. Id. at 330 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall further argued in a separate
dissent that denial of the funding of an abortion is tantamount to denying a wo-
man the right to an abortion altogether. Id at 338 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Jus-
tice Stevens also wrote a separate dissent. Id. at 349.
47. See Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1981);
Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986); Moe v. Secretary of Admin.
and Fin., 417 N.E.2d 387 (Mass. 1981).
48. Janice Steinschneider, Recent Development, State Constitutions: The New Bat-
tefteldfor Abortion Rights, 10 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 284, 287 (1987). See Kimber-
ley A. Chaput, Comment, Abortion Rights Under State Constitutions: Fighting
the Abortion War in the State Courts, 70 R. L. REv. 593, 594 (1991).
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stitution,49 the state courts can interpret their constitutions as grant-
ing greater due process rights than the due process clause of the U.S.
Constitution.50 This broad interpretation is possible even if identical
language is used in both provisions because the interpretation, not the
language, controls.51 Most courts that have been faced with the issue
of whether their state constitutions mandate funding of abortions for
indigent women have decided that the state government must fund
abortions.52
Hope v. Perales follows the logic of these decisions. However, the
New York Supreme Court has taken this reasoning beyond simply
mandating that the state fund medically necessary abortions for those
below the poverty line. The court's decision guarantees women over
the poverty line reimbursement for their medically necessary abor-
tions. It is necessary to inquire whether this mandatory funding
scheme is consistent with earlier cases construing the due process
clause of the New York Constitution. If this reasoning is found to be
consistent, it gives great support to the idea that Nebraska courts
should find that the funding of at least medically necessary abortions
for indigent women is mandated under the due process clause of the
Nebraska Constitution.
B. Hope's Consistency with Prior Cases in Construing the State Due
Process Clause
The New York Constitution's due process clause 53 and the U.S.
Constitution's due process clause54 are virtually identical. Both use
the same operative language. Therefore, one might be tempted to
think that both should be interpreted to protect the same rights.
However, New York's constitutional due process clause has not been
immune from the expansive interpretation that has been applied to
other provisions of the New York State Constitution.55
One overriding theme will be explored in cases construing the due
process clause of the New York State Constitution. The theme that
will be analyzed is the New York courts' increased willingness to use
its own interpretation to protect its citizens whenever it feels that the
federal due process clause provides insufficient protection. In order to
49. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1042 (1983).
50. Chaput, supra note 48, at 606.
51. Id. at 608.
52. I& at 616.
53. "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law." N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
54. "[Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
55. These constitutional decisions will be discussed in the discussion detailing the
differences between New York and Nebraska case law. See infra notes 81-99 and
accompanying text.
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understand the significance of the New York analysis and the differ-
ence between the New York and Nebraska approaches to their consti-
tutions, one must understand that there are three modes of state
constitutional analysis used by courts in interpreting their own state
constitutions.56 First, there is the "lock-step approach," where the
state looks to the United States Constitution in order to use an identi-
cal analysis for the state provision. This is only used when there are
parallel provisions in the state and United States Constitution.5 7 Sec-
ond, a state may take a "reactive posture," where the state court usu-
ally follows federal precedent, but will occasionally grant more rights
under its own constitution.5 8 Third, the state can take the "beyond-
the-reactive" approach in which the state analyzes its own constitu-
tional provision before looking at federal precedent.5 9 As will be seen,
New York has shown evidence of applying both the "reactive posture"
and the "beyond-the-reactive" approaches, and in doing so, has in-
creasingly interpreted its due process clause to ensure more rights to
its citizens.
In the criminal context, the New York state due process clause has
been construed expansively to afford those accused of crimes with
greater rights than has been bestowed upon them by the federal con-
stitution. For example, in People v. Isaacson,60 the police brutalized a
third party and led him to believe that he was facing a prison sentence
even though the substances found on his person after his arrest were
comprised of caffeine and not amphetamines. As a result of this police
conduct, the third party became an informant and lured the defendant
to New York to conduct a drug transaction so that New York police
could arrest and prosecute the defendant in the state.
The court seemed to be unsure about the outcome under the fed-
eral constitution, and therefore the Isaacson majority explicitly de-
cided the case on the basis of the state constitution.6 ' The court laid
out the analysis for determining whether the due process rights of a
citizen are violated under the state due process clause. First, the court
recognized that the purpose of the clause is to protect fundamental
rights of the citizen by a "shield of inherent and fundamental princi-
ples of justice."6 2 The court further argued that due process of law
mandates the courts to foster respect for personal immunities that are
fundamental.63 Factors to be considered in deciding whether police
56. Chaput, supm note 48, at 607.
57. Id
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. 378 N.E.2d 78 (N.Y. 1978).
61. Id. at 82.
62. Id.
63. I&
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conduct lives up to the aforestated principles were then enumerated.64
After weighing the factors, the court found that the defendant's due
process rights under the New York Constitution were violated.65
The court used an advanced "reactive posture" to protect its citi-
zens in this case. Because the New York court feared that the
Supreme Court would not agree that the due process rights of the de-
fendant were violated, it granted more rights under its constitution.
The fact that the court analyzed the federal case law in the area
demonstrated that the court was willing to employ such an analysis.
However, after determining that the Supreme Court might not find a
right existing under the federal due process clause, the New York
court had no alternative but to turn to its own due process clause to
ensure protection of New York citizens in such a case.
The same concerns pervade the Isaacson analysis as those that per-
vade the Hope analysis. The Isaacson court emphasized the amount of
respect that must be accorded to fundamental rights given to citizens
as did the Hope court. Since abortion is a fundamental right,66 it fol-
lows that a program that interferes with the exercise of the funda-
mental right and does not, by its terms, promote the health, comfort,
safety, and welfare of society does not comport with due process. Just
as the government interfered with the defendant in Isaacson, the state
interfered in Hope by denying money for all abortions. The govern-
ment threatened not only to interfere with the exercise of a funda-
mental right, but also threatened the health of pregnant women in
need of an abortion. By doing so, the health, comfort, safety, and wel-
fare of society were not promoted. In this regard, the Hope decision
complies with previous case law.
Cooper v. Morin 67 was another state constitutional decision upon
which the Hope decision depended. Cooper also addressed the state
due process clause. In Cooper, female pretrial detainees brought a
class action suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from restric-
tions placed on them at the county jail. The detainees were limited to
noncontact visits with both family and friends while the inmates in
the jail were afforded direct contact visits. A limit of ten minutes was
placed on the detainees while the inmates often took visits in excess of
fifteen minutes.
Once again, the New York court took an advanced "reactive pos-
ture." The court first analyzed federal case law and decided that the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution would not mandate that the detainees receive longer con-
64. I& at 83.
65. Id. at 84.
66. See In re Klein, 538 N.Y.S.2d 274, 275 (N.Y. App. Div.) appeal denied, 536 N.E.2d
627 (N.Y. 1989). See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
67. 399 N.E.2d 1188 (N.Y. 1979), cert denied, 446 U.S. 984 (1980).
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tact visits.68 This analysis again demonstrates the court's willingness
to adopt federal analysis if agreeable to the state court's view of due
process. Anticipating that the United States Supreme Court would
not protect the detainees rights under the federal due process clause,
the Cooper court progressed to a state constitutional analysis and de-
cided that the applicable test was "a balancing of the harm to the indi-
vidual resulting from the condition imposed against the benefit sought
by the government through its enforcement."69
Using this test, the court in Cooper recognized that the fundamen-
tal right of marriage and procreation weighed heavily on the detain-
ees' side of the balance. Since noncontact visits could seriously impair
family relationships, the court required the state to have a measure
that was both reasonable and necessary if the state were to abridge the
right of family life. The state's purpose in maintaining the presence of
the detainee for trial was held to be an insufficient state interest to
justify abridging the right of the detainees.70 Although the state
would be required to add more personnel and rearrange the facility,
measures that would obviously cost money, the court concluded that
the citizens' rights are of utmost importance and financial concerns
could not justify impinging on those rights.71 Therefore, the court in-
structed that a system of contact visitation be instituted in the jail and
that visitations should be allowed for a reasonable duration, at least
more than ten minutes.72
The balancing test explained in Cooper, although not outlined di-
rectly, was applied in the reasoning in Hope. As was previously dis-
cussed, a fundamental right was at issue in Hope. PCAP, by funding
only birth-related expenses even when a woman's health is
threatened, prevents a woman from exercising the fundamental right
of choice. The state's side of the balancing test was purportedly char-
acterized by the promotion of a healthy pregnancy and birth. How-
ever, this is not sensible if a woman needs an abortion for her health.
In fact, in order to carry out the objective of the statute, it would in-
deed be necessary to fund abortions. Abortions would be performed to
ensure that an unhealthy pregnancy does not occur and to ensure the
good health of children carried to term. The state should not interfere
with a woman's fundamental right to abortion if such laws defeat the
objectives of the program.
Finally, Hope also properly and convincingly relies on Rivers v.
Katz,73 a case demonstrating a "beyond-the-reactive" approach. Riv-
68. Id at 1192-93.
69. I& at 1194.
70. Id. at 1195.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1196.
73. 495 N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 1986).
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ers was based solely on the New York state due process clause, with-
out any discussion of the federal constitution at all. In Rivers, patients
who had been found to need involuntary care and treatment due to
mental illness brought a declaratory judgment action to declare that
forced treatment was unlawful and that they had a right to refuse
medication. One of the patients appealed the forced medication
through an administrative review process provided by the patients'
psychiatric center but failed.
The court's analysis, based solely on its own state constitution, sug-
gests that the court has lost a willingness to explore federal law before
interpreting its constitution. This is characterized in the "beyond-the-
reactive" approach.
The court maintained that "due process requires that a court bal-
ance the individual's liberty interest against the State's asserted com-
pelling need on the facts of each case" in deciding whether to forcibly
administer medication.74 Rivers recognized that citizens of New York
have a right to decide what will be done with their body and to control
medical treatment.75 The right to reject treatment is not absolute and
may be overridden by compelling state interests.7 6 The court held
that if a patient has the capacity to reason and come to a decision, then
the state may not forcibly medicate.77 Further, the fact of mental ill-
ness or institutionalization alone cannot satisfy the "lack of capacity to
reason" standard in order to infringe the patient's constitutional
right.78 In addition, the court found the administrative review pro-
ceedings were inadequate to protect the patient's due process rights.79
No standards were listed and no criteria were available articulating
what factors were to be considered during the proceedings.
Hope follows the reasoning in the Rivers case. Hope cannot be crit-
icized for not considering the reasoning used by the United States
Supreme Court in interpreting the federal constitution because Rivers
also took the "beyond-the-reactive" approach. The Rivers court has
demonstrated the willingness of New York courts to analyze their
own constitution independently, without being limited to the extent of
protection under the federal constitution.
As in Rivers, the Hope court showed respect for a broad range of
rights retained by its citizens that may or may not be found within the
United States Constitution. Just as the patients in Rivers had a funda-
74. Id. at 344.
75. I& at 341.
76. Id at 343.
77. Id. The court determined that if the patient is found to lack the capability to
make a reasoned decision, the court must make the further determination that
the treatment is in the patient's best interests and the side effects suffered from
the medication are the least intrusive of any possible treatments. Id at 344.
78. Id at 341-42.
79. Id- at 344.
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mental right to determine their treatment, a woman has a fundamen-
tal right to an abortion. It is undisputed that the state has a
compelling need to promote healthy pregnancies and a healthy child-
birth. However, the PCAP rules did not serve these compelling needs,
and thus, cannot be used to abridge a constitutional right.80
These cases convincingly demonstrate that the New York Supreme
Court has consistently upheld the state constitutional rights of its citi-
zens when the United States Supreme Court has failed to protect
these rights. In the earlier due process cases, the court was more will-
ing to rely on federal analysis, but recently the court has become more
willing to base its decision on the state constitutional due process
clause.
C. Comparison of New York and Nebraska Historical Interpretations of
Their Own State Constitutions
Nebraska and New York have different histories in construing
their state constitutions. The histories are not contradictory, just dif-
ferent in the approach each has taken in construing their respective
state constitutions in light of the federal constitution. The Hope ma-
jority properly based its decision in Hope upon the fact that New York
courts have traditionally construed the state constitution more
broadly than the United States Constitution when necessary to protect
its citizens' rights.81 The New York courts have construed their con-
stitution broadly both when the state's constitutional language is iden-
tical to its federal counterpart and when its language is substantially
different. These decisions provide additional support for the idea that
New York has assumed a "reactive posture" and the "beyond-the-reac-
tive" approach. On the other hand, Nebraska has a tradition of decid-
ing issues raised under its constitution utilizing an identical analysis
used to construe the same provision in the United States Constitution.
In other words, the Nebraska court uses the "lock-step" approach in
state constitutional analysis.
New York has given a broader reading to its constitution when the
provisions in question are different from the federal counterpart. For
example, the language of Article I, Section 6 of the New York Consti-
tution is different from the First Amendment of the United States
80. Rivers supports the decision in Hope in yet another way that was not used by the
court. An individual's constitutional rights do not depend on the current whims
of the state. If it is a constitutional right of New York citizens to determine their
medical treatment even if it promotes an undesirable outcome for the state,
surely the state may not refuse to fund the women's right to choose her medical
treatment in Hope.
81. Hope v. Perales, 571 N.Y.S.2d 972, 978 (1991), aff'd, 595 N.Y.S.2d 948 (App. Div.
1993).
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Constitution. In Immuno, A G. v. Moor-Jankowski,82 the New York
Court of Appeals had no trouble finding that greater rights are
granted to the speech of its citizens than that mandated by the differ-
ently-worded first amendment.83 On appeal to the United States
Supreme Court, the Court remanded the case to the New York Court
of Appeals after deciding that First Amendment rights were not im-
plicated.84 The New York Court of Appeals decided that its state con-
stitution required the court to read the letter involved in the dispute
under a broader standard that the Supreme Court had found was not
required under the First Amendment.8 5 Again, an attempt to read lib-
eral rights into the United States Constitution was made and
thwarted. The court did find a way to protect its citizens through the
state constitution, but only after a time-consuming and costly remand.
This is a great example of the "reactive posture" seen previously in
the due process cases.
Nebraska's parallel provision to the First Amendment is also dif-
ferently worded than the federal counterpart. When a statute prohib-
iting obscene telephone calls was challenged as being overbroad and,
therefore, violative of both the state and United States constitutional
free speech provisions, the Nebraska court decided that neither provi-
sion was violated.8 6 The court, consistent with the "lock-step" ap-
proach, claimed that Nebraska had already decided that the state free
speech provision would not provide greater protection in this area
than the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.8 7
Moreover, New York courts have also been willing to expand their
citizens' rights when the state and federal constitutional language is
identical. The due process cases described above are one good illustra-
tion. The New York state constitutional counterpart to the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, Section 12 of Article I,
has also been construed as giving New York citizens greater rights,
even though the language of this section is identical to the Fourth
Amendment.88 When the New York Court of Appeals first considered
the case, it held, on Fourth Amendment grounds, that the search in
82. 567 N.E.2d 1270 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2261 (1991).
83. Id. at 1277. In Immuno, the defendant, an editor of a scientific journal, published
a letter to the editor. The letter asserted that the plaintiff planned to establish a
facility which would manufacture biological products from chimpanzees. Fur-
ther, the letter alleged that there was a possibility that the products would spread
hepatitis.
84. Immuno v. Moor-Jankowski, 497 U.S. 1021 (1990).
85. Immuno, A.G. v. Moor-Jankowski, 567 N.E.2d 1270, 1279-80 (N.Y. 1991).
86. State v. Kipf, 234 Neb. 227, 237-44, 450 N.W.2d 397, 406-09 (1990).
87. Id. at 237, 450 N.W.2d at 406.
88. People v. Harris, 570 N.E.2d 1051 (N.Y. 1991). The court recognized that it is
desirable to interpret the provisions in the same way to facilitate the implementa-
tion of the rules but that the federalist system of government allows states to
confer greater rights through the interpretation of their state constitution. Id. at
[Vol. 72:586
ABORTION RIGHTS
dispute was illegal,8 9 a decision reminiscent of the "reactive posture."
The United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to
the New York court.90 On remand, the evidence was rendered inad-
missible under the New York State Constitution.91
The Nebraska Constitution's due process clause92 is identical in its
operative language to the due process clause of the United States Con-
stitution93 as is the New York Constitution's due process clause. Yet,
the Nebraska Supreme Court has clung to the "lock-step" approach,
which is unlike New York's approach. For example, in State ex rel
Spire v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.,94 an act limiting the Public
Service Commission's telephone rate-making authority was held to be
nonviolative of both the Nebraska and United States Constitutions us-
ing the same analysis under both constitutions. Additionally, in State
1054. In Harris, the police obtained a statement from the defendant one hour
after he was arrested without a warrant for the murder of his girlfriend.
89. People v. Harris, 532 N.E.2d 1229 (N.Y. 1989) rev'd and remanded, 495 U.S. 14
(1990).
90. New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (1990).
91. People v. Harris, 570 N.E.2d 1051,1055 (N.Y. 1991). The court used a noninterpre-
tive analysis as opposed to an interpretive analysis in coming to its decision. In
other words, the court did not examine the language of the provision but "'pro-
ceed[ed] from a judicial perception of sound policy, justice and fundamental fair-
ness."' Id at 1053 (quoting People v. P.J. Video, 501 N.E.2d 556, 560 (N.Y. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987)). In doing so the court reiterated that the state
constitution, through constitutional interpretation, has given greater protection
to rights concerning due process, self-incrimination, and the right to counsel than
the federal counterparts have given. Id, at 1054.
A similar conclusion had been reached previously in People v. P.J. Video, Inc.,
501 N.E.2d 556 (N.Y. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987). In P.J. Video, the
court held that the state constitution requires more support for the issuance of a
search warrant than is required by the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 558. Officers
in P.J. Video submitted affidavits alleging that the defendants possessed films
containing offensive sex scenes. However, the officers simply characterized the
films as offensive and did not show sufficient evidence that the films indeed met
this requirement. Using the noninterpretive analysis explained above, the court
decided that policy, justice, and fundamental fairness required the police to show
more evidence for their conclusion under the state constitution. Id. at 564.
Again, the court recognized the desirableness of interpreting the federal and state
constitutions in the same manner but stated that this was only one consideration
in deciding whether to read the state constitution more broadly. Id. at 561. Simi-
lar analyses appear in at least one other case. See People v. Hobson, 348 N.E.2d
894 (N.Y. 1976).
92. "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law." NEB. CONST. art. I, § 3.
93. "NI]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
94. 233 Neb. 262, 279-88, 445 N.W.2d 284, 297-300 (1989). Even though the case in-
volved a procedural due process analysis, it nonetheless illustrates the Nebraska
court's tendency to evaluate the Nebraska and U.S Constitutions under the same
analysis.
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v. Hankins,95 the Supreme Court held that the Nebraska statute re-
quiring a defendant to prove insanity as an affirmative defense did not
violate the Nebraska and federal constitutional due process clauses.
Again, consistent with the "lock-step" approach, the court uses one
analysis for both constitutions. The method by which the court dis-
misses a separate state constitutional claim suggests that the court has
perhaps not thought of using its state constitution to broaden the
rights of Nebraska citizens.
There are exceptions to this trend, however. One case suggests
that when the Nebraska court is faced with a constitutional provision
newly amended and different from the federal counterpart, the court
will use its own analysis. For example, the court was faced with a
challenge that a state statute violated the Nebraska "Right to Bear
Arms" amendment to Article I, Section 1 of the Nebraska Constitu-
tion.96 The statute in question made it illegal to possess a machine
gun, short rifle, or a short shotgun. The Nebraska Supreme Court up-
held the statute as a valid exercise of police power under the Nebraska
Constitution with no discussion of the United States Constitution.97
The separate analysis was necessary in this situation, however, since
the Nebraska Constitution had been amended the year before. Yet,
this decision may demonstrate a willingness of the court to view chal-
lenges to citizens' constitutional rights brought solely under the Ne-
braska Constitution more broadly.
The Nebraska Supreme Court has also recognized, when it was
faced with a Nebraska law decision of which it disapproved made by a
federal district court judge, that it (the Nebraska Supreme Court) is
the final arbiter in Nebraska law and that the court must follow its
own analysis and reach a conclusion based on that analysis.98 Undis-
putedly, the court recognizes its responsibility to make Nebraska law
for its citizens. If a challenge were clearly presented to a Nebraska
court, under the Nebraska State Constitution and not under its federal
counterpart, with a case where Nebraska citizens are clearly not af-
forded the rights they deserve under the United States Constitution,
the court might accept the challenge and guarantee the suggested
rights under the Nebraska State Constitution.
The "lock-step" approach used by the Nebraska Supreme Court
does not suggest hostility to the idea of broadening the interpretation
of the state constitution. Perhaps the court has not been actively en-
couraged to do so by attorneys. Perhaps the court has not been faced
with a situation compelling enough to so construe the Nebraska
Constitution.
95. 232 Neb. 608, 637, 441 N.W.2d 854, 875-76 (1989).
96. State v. LaChapelle, 234 Neb. 458, 451 N.W.2d 689 (1990).
97. 1& at 462-63, 451 N.W.2d at 690-91.
98. Patteson v. Johnson, 219 Neb. 852, 861, 367 N.W.2d 123, 130 (1985).
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The same argument that was raised in Hope could be brought
before the Nebraska courts, and the lawyer raising the argument
could encourage a decision based, not on the United States Constitu-
tion, but on the Nebraska due process clause. There arguably would
be no reason for the court not to consider the claim, and the court
could quite easily decide that the funding of medically necessary abor-
tions is mandated under the Nebraska Constitution. This action by
the court would not be inconsistent with Nebraska precedent. It
would simply be a step forward from a regressive "lock-step" approach
to a more progressive "beyond-the reactive" approach advocated by
many commentators. 99 New York has taken this step, and many other
state courts have realized the great potential for individual rights
under their state constitutions. Nebraska has only to join their ranks.
D. Applicable Medicaid Provisions Under Nebraska Law' 0 0
The Nebraska Medical Assistance Program (NMAP) covers abor-
tions only in those situations where federal funding is available. In
other words, abortions are covered only "when the life of the mother
would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term."101 Certifica-
tion of the physician is also required as mandated by the Code of Fed-
eral Regulations.102
While funds covering abortion are severely restricted, the NMAP
does cover a wide range of physicians' expenses related to pregnancy.
Such expenses include prenatal care, delivery, and postpartum care.103
For those women who do not meet eligibility requirements104 for
Medicaid themselves, NMAP does provide services to the women on
the theory that the unborn child is eligible.10 5 These services include
pregnancy-related, delivery, postpartum services, 0 6 and unrelated
services that must directly benefit the unborn or newborn child.107
If closely read, the regulations provide one of the purposes that
the state of Nebraska has for funding prenatal services under the
Medicaid program. Listed as covered services are those "[s]ervices to a
woman during pregnancy which are directed to protecting and ensur-
99. See Chaput, supra note 48, at 607.
100. Due to the past Nebraska legislative special session's determination to cut
Nebraska Medicaid prenatal funding, the reader should beware that the
following Nebraska regulations may no longer be current.
101. 471 NEB. ADMIN. R. & REGS. § 18-004.08 (1982)(Dept. of Social Services).
102. Id- § 18-004.08A.
103. 471 NEB. ADMIN. R & REGS. § 18-004.21 (1989)(Dept. of Social Services).
104. These eligibility requirements are based solely on a woman's income and the in-
come of the father if he is present in the home as well. 471 NEB. ADMIN. R. &
REGs. § 28-001.03 (1988)(Dept. of Social Services).
105. 471 NEB. ADmIN. R. & REaGS. § 2-006.06A (1991)(Dept. of Social Services).
106. Id- § 2-006.06B.
107. Id. § 2-006.06C.
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ing the health of the woman and the fetus."108 This purpose is reiter-
ated at least once more in the Code where "[m]edically necessary
services to ensure a healthy outcome for the current pregnancy" are
listed as covered services.109
Thus, the stage is set for a due process argument based on the Ne-
braska state constitution. As in Hope, pregnant women who are eligi-
ble for medical assistance because of their income or because of their
status as pregnant women, are denied funding for their medically nec-
essary abortions. The situation in Nebraska is even more tragic than
the situation existing in Hope because abortion has been singled out in
Nebraska as one medically necessary procedure that will not be cov-
ered by Medicaid, in spite of the fact that the Medicaid program is to
be used to fund other medically necessary procedures. PCAP simply
eliminated abortion from its coverage because it was not specifically
enumerated by statute as required by all procedures covered by
PCAP.
E. Due Process Analysis in Nebraska Courts
The Nebraska Supreme Court has used the following substantive
due process analysis when faced with a claim that an individual is be-
ing deprived of due process of law. First, the court must ascertain "the
degree of judicial scrutiny to be focused on the statute."lO If the court
decides that a fundamental right is involved, the court will invoke the
standard of strict scrutiny; that is, a compelling state interest will have
to be found in order to justify the statute."'1 If, however, no funda-
mental right is present, a statute rationally related to a legitimate gov-
ernmental purpose will suffice, and if satisfied, the act will be declared
constitutional and not violative of the due process clause.1l 2
The Nebraska Supreme Court has never been faced with the ques-
tion of whether the Nebraska due process clause requires the state to
fund medically necessary abortions for indigent women when no fed-
eral reimbursement is available but when the state does pay for preg-
nancy-related expenses. If the court agrees to consider the question
under the Nebraska State Constitution, as previously discussed, the
court's decision must be in the affirmative if it were to use the reason-
ing of the Hope court.
108. 1& § 2-006.06B (emphasis added).
109. Id- § 2-006.06B1.
110. Robotham v. State, 241 Neb. 379, 382, 488 N.W.2d 533, 538 (1992).
111. Id
112. Id; State ex reL Spire v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 233 Neb. 262, 289,445 N.W.2d
284, 300 (1989).
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1. Fundamental Right?
The first hurdle that a lawyer must overcome in presenting a Hope
argument to the Nebraska Supreme Court is to convince the court
that a woman's right to a medically necessary abortion is a fundamen-
tal right. In fact, this is the most important hurdle. The court has
recognized that when a statute is "'subject to strict scrutiny, the stat-
ute always, or nearly always... is struck down[,] the only critical deci-
sion is whether strict scrutiny should be invoked at all.' "113
The Hope court had the benefit of a previous New York case that
implicitly held that a woman has a fundamental right to an abortion
free from governmental interference under the New York Constitu-
tion.11 4 The Nebraska Supreme Court has not recognized an explicit
fundamental right to an abortion without governmental interference
under its state constitution. However, the Nebraska Supreme Court
has recognized that privacy is a fundamental right.115 Even though
the court claims it has recognized no right to privacy under the state
constitution broader than the federal constitutional right,116 the court
does not reveal that the case on which it relies for this proposition had
nothing to do with the constitutional right of privacy. Rather, the case
concerned the Nebraska statute prohibiting the invasion of privacy as
a tort.1 17 Therefore, an argument that such a right does exist as part
of the Nebraska state due process clause would not be precluded in
Nebraska courts.
Even if the court insists that the right to privacy is no broader than
that recognized by the United States Supreme Court, the Court has
decided many cases that would suggest that abortion is indeed a funda-
mental right and that a portion of that right is the freedom to make
decisions concerning procreation without governmental restraint or
interference.118 In fact, the Nebraska Supreme Court has admitted
that the right to privacy pertains to "'matters relating to marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and
education.' ,,19 Indeed, this fundamental right to privacy is what
spurred the United States Supreme Court to recognize a woman's
right to an abortion in Roe v. Wade.120 In fact, the Roe Court recog-
113. Robotham v. State, 241 Neb. 379, 382, 488 N.W.2d 533, 537 (1992)(quoting Massa-
chusetts B& of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 319 (1976)(Marshall, J.,
dissenting)).
114. In re Klein, 538 N.Y.S.2d 274, 275 (App. Div.), appeal denied, 536 N.E.2d 627
(1989).
115. Robotham v. State, 241 Neb. 379, 383, 488 N.W.2d 533, 538 (1992).
116. Id. at 384, 488 N.W.2d at 539.
117. Schoneweis v. Dando, 231 Neb. 180, 435 N.W.2d 666 (1989).
118. See, e.g, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Wil-
liamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
119. Robotham v. State, 241 Neb. 379, 383, 488 N.W.2d 533, 538 (1992).
120. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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nized: first, that only fundamental rights are embraced by the concept
of privacy;12 1 second, that the right of privacy includes the abortion
decision;122 and finally, that "[w]here certain 'fundamental rights' are
involved, the Court has held that regulation limiting these rights may
be justified only by a 'compelling state interest.' "123 Perhaps these
decisions have come under scrutiny by the present Court, but this does
not prevent Nebraska courts from embracing this reasoning. The Ne-
braska Supreme Court has admitted that matters relating to procrea-
tion are protected by a right to privacy and that this right to privacy is
a fundamental right. Therefore, Nebraska should decide that a wo-
man's right to an abortion is a fundamental right and should allow
only a compelling state interest to justify the statute; further, the stat-
ute should be narrowly tailored to effectuate its purpose. This is the
same analysis found in Hope.
2. Hope Analysis Applied in Nebraska
Once the court accepts the responsibility to its citizens to expand
rights under the state constitution and decides that the right to an
abortion without state interference is fundamental, the Hope analysis
can be freely applied to the due process clause of the Nebraska State
Constitution. As in New York, the Nebraska lawmakers may prefer
one result of pregnancy over another, but they cannot interfere with a
fundamental constitutional right. By funding only childbirth with one
narrow exception, the Nebraska Medicaid program has funded a pre-
ferred conduct and denied treatment of the medical necessity as a re-
sult of the pregnancy. The purposes of the Nebraska Medicaid
program are to provide services to promote healthy mothers and ba-
bies. The means used to carry out the program cannot be found to be
narrowly tailored to its objectives. The policy of funding only child-
birth cannot promote healthy mothers and babies when it denies nec-
essary treatment to people with a bona fide medical need. This
program may force an indigent woman to forego her health in order to
carry a child, and as in Hope, force the birth of unhealthy children.
Admittedly, funding abortions when no federal funding is available
would place a financial burden on the state, but in no way should fi-
nancial considerations be the basis for denying a citizen a fundamental
right. Therefore, the Nebraska Supreme Court should decide that the
Medicaid system as it exists now--denying pregnant indigent women
medically necessary abortions- violates the due process clause of the
Nebraska State Constitution.
121. I- at 152.
122. Id at 155.
123. Id
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IV. CONCLUSION
Hope v. Perales provides a prime example of a state court defend-
ing the rights of its citizens by interpreting its state constitution more
broadly than the parallel provision in the United States Constitution.
The Hope analysis clearly follows the previous decisions of the New
York Court of Appeals and demonstrates the powerful use of the "be-
yond-the-reactive" approach in state constitutional analysis.
This trend in the law has great promise for citizens in states like
Nebraska who wish to protect their rights from being abridged by a
capricious United States Supreme Court. One obvious area in which
many citizens have this desire is in the area of abortion. The Hope
decision provides a possible blueprint for an argument for attorneys
confronted with this issue and could be used to successfully challenge
the present Nebraska Medicaid system. The Hope decision also pro-
vides support for future constitutional cases and should be used to en-
sure Nebraska citizens more rights under their state constitution than
provided to them under the United States Constitution.
Marni Brown '94
